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CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT BY
PROVIDING THE MEANS: THE STAPLE
ARTICLE OF COMMERCE
DOCTRINE AND AN
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR COPYRIGHT
LAW*
[C]ontributory infringement ... is grounded on the recognition that
adequate protection of a monopoly may require [that] the courts look
beyond . . . [direct infringement] to the products or activities that
make such duplication possible. The staple article of commerce doctrine must strike a balance between a copyright holder's demand for
effective-not merely symbolic-protection of the statutory monopoly,
and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.**
The Copyright Act does not expressly render a third-party lia-

ble for facilitating an act of copyright infringement.' The case law,
however, includes many instances in which the courts have imposed
such liability on third parties. 2 The courts have found this liability

under the judicially-created doctrine of contributory infringement. 3
This doctrine, which is extremely flexible, has allowed the courts to
apply it to a broad variety of factual situations. 4 It is flexible be* The author intends to enter this article in the 1985 Nathan Burkan
Memorial competition sponsored by the American Society of Composers,
Authors and Publishers.
** Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 789
(1984) (a recent pronouncement of contributory infringement for providing the
means).
1. The copyright statute proscribes direct infringement and the authorization of such infringement but does not impose third-party liability on those who
merely facilitate another's act of direct infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 106, 501
(1982). See also infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
2. A third party is a person other than the party who actually completes or
performs the act of direct infringement. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1327
(5th ed. 1979) (defining a third party as one who is not party to a transaction,
but who has rights arising from the transaction; in the case of contributory infringement, this would be liability arising from the act of infringement).
3. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
4. Such liability has arisen from such diverse circumstances as where any
further contribution by the defendants would have constituted taking part in
the final act, Kalem Co., v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 63 (1911) (the defendant
produced and promoted a movie version of a popular book whose exhibition was
the direct infringement), to where a retailer was liable for the infringing acts of
an independent concessionaire operating within its store. Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1963) (sales of infringing sound
recordings). See infra notes 33, 37-40, 46-64, 70-78 & 84-99 and accompanying
text.

The John
Marshall Law Review
I

[Vol. 18:703

cause the courts have melded its dual sources of origin 5 into a somewhat indistinguishable whole.6 Recently, courts have introduced
another, novel basis of liability for contributory copyright infringement: the staple article of commerce doctrine. 7 Its origin, however,
lies in patent law.
This comment discusses the propriety of applying the staple article of commerce doctrine to copyright law. It examines the current scope of statutory copyright protection and the doctrine of
contributory infringement in both copyright and patent law. This
analysis determines that the courts should not incorporate the staple article of commerce doctrine into copyright law in its present
condition, even though it embodies a principle useful to copyright
law. 9 This comment proposes an alternative means of employing
this principle in cases where the defendant provides the means of
infringement. 10
STATUTORY COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant authors and inventors exclusive rights in their works." These rights were
5. These independent bases are the agency doctrine of respondeatsuperior,and the tort doctrine of joint and several liability. See infra notes 27 & 28
and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
7. The staple article of commerce doctrine examines the quantity and
quality of non-infringing uses for an article which the defendant sold to the
direct infringer for use in an act of infringement and imposes or denies liability
on this basis. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
the adoption of the staple article of commerce doctrine into copyright law, see
infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text. For a definition of a "staple article"
in the patent context see infra note 120.
8. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). Contributory patent infringement existed
as a judically-created doctrine prior to the current patent act, but the staple
article of commerce doctrine did not exist in its present form until the current
patent statute. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180, 184
(1980) (discussing the history of contributory infringement as a judical doctrine,
but holding that 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c) & (d) constitute a new balance for contributory infringement); Oddi, ContributoryInfringement/PatentMisuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 73, 75-81, 83-87 (1982) (discussing the
developmental history of contributory patent infringement and the staple article of commerce doctrine). See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c) & (d) (1982); infra note
107 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 125-29 & 132-38 and accompanying text.
10. The courts have applied the staple article of commerce test to copyright
cases where liability was contingent upon the defendant providing some device
which was the means of infringement. In these cases, the courts deviated from
the more traditional contributory infringement analysis. See infra notes 70-78
& 91-101 and accompanying text.
11. Article I, sec. 8 of the Constitution provides:
[t]he Congress shall have Power ...
[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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designed to increase the public availability of information and
ideas. 12 Copyright law, therefore, involves a balance between the
private interest and the public interest.' 3 On balance, the private
interest is subordinate to the public interest. 14 The private interest
of the author must remain protected from invasion, however, so
that it may continue to serve its public purpose. 15 Congress has ex12. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774,
782 (1984) (the purpose of copyright is to promote access to the fruit of individual creative effort); Twentieth Cent. Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) ("Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately ... [promote the] broad public availability of literature,
music, and other arts."); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977)
(noting the public interest in dissemination of information in areas of broad
concern); Rosemont Ent. Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 307 (2d Cir.
1966), cer. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); see also Allied Artists Pictures Corp. v.
Rhodes, 496 F. Supp. 408, 446 (S.D. Ohio) (the fundamental purpose is to advance the arts and sciences), modified, 679 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1980). Courts have
recognized that the private incentive of a limited monopoly encourages the creative effort in order to increase the availability of information and works of art.
See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (the objective is to encourage the progress of science and the arts by granting a productive incentive);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("encouragement of individual effort
advances the public welfare"); Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d
14, 23 (2d Cir. 1976) (by acting as a reward, the copyright grant recognizes the
role of the artist in society and the need to encourage production and dissemination of his works); Gero v. Seven-Up Co., 535 F. Supp. 212, 216 (E.D.N.Y.)
("Copyright protection was [intended] to encourage the dissemination of ideas
by protecting the embodiment or expression of an idea in a creative work, and
reserving rights in it to that creator."), afl'd, 714 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1982).
13. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774,
872-83 (1984) (observing that the constant shift in the balance has induced numerous statutory revisions by Congress who is in the best position to strike the
proper balance); Twentieth Cent. Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 157 (1975)
(the limited scope and duration of the copyright grant reflect the balance); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that it is
for Congress to decide the balance of interests in copyright law). For this reason, the courts must recognize that the copyright statute must be interpreted in
light of its basic purpose. Sony, supra, at 783-84; Twentieth Cent. Music Corp.,
supra, at 156; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
14. Twentieth Cent. Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (the private incentive of the copyright grant must ultimately serve its public purpose);
see Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("The sole interest of the
United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of the author.").
15. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 309 (2d Cir.
1963) (the purposes for copyright protection are better served by imposing liability on the contributory infringer than by allowing the copyright owner to
bear the loss resulting from the infringement); De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d
408, 413 (2d Cir. 1944) (observing the danger to authors if there is no liability for
"innocent" infringement); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 1984 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983) (observing that the non-protection
of the copyrights involved would result in a disincentive for others' production
of such works); Encyclopaedia Brittanica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 542 F. Supp.
1156, 1174 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (without protection, the fruit of the productive effort is lost); Elektra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Dist., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821,
825 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (granted preliminary injunction against a contributory infringer because non-protection of the exclusive rights would defeat the purpose
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ercised its constitutional authority several times to maintain the
proper balance between these interests.' 6
The current copyright statute confers upon the copyright
owner, inter alia, the exclusive right to reproduce and to sell copies' 7 of his works.' 8 It defines infringement as the invasion of these
of the statute); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1385-86
(Ct. Cl. 1973), (observing that the alternative of not protecting exclusive rights
would be massive public support of the arts), qff'd, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
16. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (providing for the protection of maps, charts, and books); Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831)
(adding musical compositions); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870)
(adding dramatic compositions, engravings, cuts, prints, photographs and negatives, paintings, drawings, chromoes, statues, and models or designs for works of
art); Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (formerly codified as 17
U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976)) (protecting "all the writings of an author"); Act of Aug.
24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488 (1912) (formerly codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810
(1976)) (adding motion pictures); Sound Recording Amendment of 1971, Pub. L.
No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971) (formerly codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-810 (1976))
(adding sound recordings); Copyright Revision Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982)) (revising the statute
by adding pantomimes, choreographic works, and audiovisal works, and by defining protected works as "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression ... from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or
device").
17. The statute provides:
Subject to ... [certain statutory exclusions], the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the
following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform
the copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the
copyrighted work publicly.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
The statute defines "copies" as "material objects .

.

. in which a work is

fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the work
can be perceived ... or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid
of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
18. Protected works are described by the statute as follows:
(a)

Copyright protection subsists .

.

. in original works of authorship

fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now or later developed, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of authorship
include the following categories:
(1) literary works;
(2) musical works, including any accompanying words;
(3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music;
(4) pantomimes and choreographic works;
(5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
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rights 19 and prescribes a potent array of remedies to compensate for
copyright infringement.20 Despite this broad protection against direct infringement, 21 the copyright statute does not expressly render
a third party liable for merely facilitating an act of direct infringe23
ment. 22 Such an indirect participant is a contributory infringer.
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; and
(7) sound recordings.
(b) In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, or embodied in such work.
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1982).
19. "Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner
...is an infringer of the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982); see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists T.V., Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 394-95 (1968) (no copyright infringement absent performance); cf Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218
(1954) ("Absent copying there can be no infringement of copyright."); WhiteSmith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1, 11 (1908) (copyright protects
only the tangible result from copying).
Copyright infringement is characterized as a strict liability tort. Intent to
infringe is therefore not a prerequisite to liability for infringement. See, e.g.,
F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 229 (1952) (Court
imposing liability, despite the defendant's ignorance of the infringing nature of
the statues which it sold); Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198
(1931) (holding that the intent to infringe is unnecessary); Shapiro, Bernstein &
Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1957) (holding that a strict construction of the copyright statute required finding an unknowing infringer liable);
De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410-11 (2d Cir. 1944) (observing that the statute does not absolve the innocent infringer, but permits a mitigation of damages
for such an infringer); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Dist.,
Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 48-49 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that intent is not a necessary
element of infringement); see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1982) (statutory provision for damages permitting diminution, but not elimination, of damages for an
infringer who believed in good faith that his actions were non-infringing).
Strict liability also applies to contributory infringement evolved from the
agency doctrine of respondeatsuperior. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L.
Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d.Cir. 1963). For a discussion of the current
scope of respondeatsuperiorin copyright law see infra notes 32-40 and accompanying text. But see infra note 34 and accompanying text (indicating apparent
departure from such strict liability).
20. The copyright statute makes a copyright infringer subject to injunction,
17 U.S.C. § 502 (1982), to impoundment of any infringing articles in his possession, 17 U.S.C. § 503 (1982), to liability for any actual profits earned through his
infringing activity, and actual or statutory damages. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1982).
21. "Direct infringement" refers to an act which directly violates the terms
of the copyright statute. See supra notes 17 & 19 and accompanying text. A
"direct infringer" is therefore a party whose actions actually violate the express
terms of the statute. But see infra note 25 and accompanying text (defining
contributory infringement).
22. See supra note 19 (citing the statutory provision defining infringement).
Some commentators have observed that the statutory phrase "to authorize," 17
U.S.C. § 106 (1982), establishes liability for third-party defendants, N. Boon.
STYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 10:8 (1981) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 61, 159, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5674, 5775-76); 3
M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04(A) (rel. 15 June, 1983), but the statute,
strictly construed, does not expressly provide for the liability of such parties.
The House Report states that Congress intended this phrase to avoid the issue
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CONTRIBUTORY COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT

The judicially-created doctrine of contributory copyright infringement renders third parties liable for their indirect participation in acts of copyright infringement. 24 A party who authorizes,
facilitates, participates in, or benefits from an act of infringement
may be a contributory copyright infringer. 25 Courts have applied
this doctrine to a variety of different factual settings. 26 The flexibility of contributory infringement is attributable to its dual sources of
origin.
Contributory copyright infringement arose from two distinct

legal theories: respondeatsuperior2 7 and "joint and several liabilof contributory infringement. Its example of the meaning of the phrase indicates that Congress may have intended a strict construction for it. See H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5674; see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, at 159 (indicating that Congress intended to leave the current law regarding contributory infringement
unchanged).
23. Compare infra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing contributory
infringement) with supra note 21 (discussing direct infringement).
24. The doctrine of contributory infringement does not exist on a statutory
foundation, rather, it exists based on judicial precedent. See infa notes 32-40,
46-69 & 79-98 and accompanying text.
The earliest American case to find a party liable for copyright infringement
for merely contributing to copyright infringement, but not for technically violating the provisions of the copyright statute, was Harper v. Shoppell, 28 F. 613,
615 (S.D.N.Y. 1886). The Harperdefendant made and sold a printing plate for a
copyrighted newspaper knowing that it would be used to make infringing copies
of the paper. The court held that the defendant "sanctioned the appropriation
of the plaintiff's copyrighted matter, and occupie[d] the position of a party acting in concert with the ... [direct infringer] and is responsible with him as a
joint tort-feasor." Id. It is interesting to observe that the Harper court cited a
leading contributory patent infringement case as authority for its holding. Id.
at 615, citing Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100); see
infra notes 112-13 and accompanying text. The first reported use of the phrase
"contributory infringement" in copyright law was by the Supreme Court in
Scribner v. Straus, 210 U.S. 352, 355 (1908) (defendant not liable because the
evidence was insufficient to establish that he had induced the direct
infringement).
25. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 10:8 (1981); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984) (a party who knowingly "induces, causes, or materially contributes to" an act of infringement is a contributory infringer). See
infra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several liability). A
party who has a direct financial interest in an infringing activity and is in a
position to supervise or control the activity may also be liable as a contributory
copyright infringer. See infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing contributory infringement based on the doctrine of respondeat superior).
26. See supra note 4; see also infra notes 33, 37-40, 46-64, 70-77 & 84-99 and
accompanying text for examples of the various factual situations in which
courts have applied the doctrine.
27. The agency doctrine of respondeat superior applies most generally to
the master-servant or employer-employee relationship. See E. KITNER & J.
LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 430 (2d ed. 1982). This doctrine imputes the servant's liability to the master if the liability arises from acts
performed within the scope of the master-servant relationship. Technically, it
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ity. '128 The courts' application of these independent foundations has
rendered them nearly indistinguishable. 29 Recently, the courts
have spawned a third theory for contributory liability: the staple
30
article of commerce doctrine.
ContributoryInfringement and the Doctrine of Respondeat
Superior
Liability for contributory copyright infringement is often based
on the agency doctrine of respondeatsuperior.31 The central focus
of inquiry in this type of case is the relationship between the alleged
contributory infringer and the direct infringer and any direct financial interest that the defendant had in the act of infringement. 32
Based on this relationship, courts will find corporate officers and
controlling shareholders liable as contributory infringers for corporate acts of infringement. 33 At the very least, a contributory inapplies only within the limits of the master-servant relationship so that a

master is not responsible for the acts of the servant which were performed
outside the scope of this relationship. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th

ed. 1979). In the copyright setting, however, courts have not so technically restricted this agency doctrine. See infra notes 34 & 36-40 and accompanying text.
28. Joint and several liability is a tort doctrine which renders a third party
liable for knowingly acting in concert with the prime tortfeasor or by knowingly giving substantial assistance to the tortious activity of the other. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). This doctrine applies to copyright
infringement because such infringement is a tort, Stabilisierungsfonds Fur
Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Dist. Party, Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1981),
and all who knowingly participate in or further tortious activity are jointly and
severally liable together with the prime tortfeasor. See, e.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); see also Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d
354, 365 n.9 (9th Cir. 1947); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music
Dist., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983); infra note 44 and accompanying
text.
29. The expansion of respondeatsuperiorand the failure of many courts to
expressly acknowledge doctrinal distinctions between respondeatsuperior and
joint and several liability when finding liability for contributory infringement,
may be why the distinctions between these separate theories are now obscured.
See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 45758 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984)
(the lines between contributory infringement and vicarious liability are not
clearly drawn).
30. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 78789 (1984); Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q.
1152 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
31. See supra note 27.
32. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
33. Seee.g., Bally Midway Mfg. Co. v. American Postage Mach., Inc., 1983
COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
25,601 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1983) (corporate officer
and shareholder liable for corporate infringements, despite non-participation);
Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (D.R.I. 1982) (corporate
officers liable despite ignorance of infringements); Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 213
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fringer is liable where he was active in the infringement, aware of it
34
at the time it occurred, or derived direct financial benefit from it.
Although, liability for contributory infringement sometimes arises
from facts more supportive of traditional respondeatsuperior principles,3 5 courts have not strictly limited liability to the technical
36
limits of this agency doctrine.

The "dance hall" cases reshaped respondeat superior into its

37
current form in the law of contributory copyright infringement.

U.S.P.Q. 212 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (non-participating shareholder liable for radio
station's infringements); Boz Scaggs Music v. KND Corp., 491 F. Supp. 908 (D.
Conn. 1980) (radio station manager personally liable for station's infringements); F.E.L. Pub., Ltd. v. National Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 466 F. Supp. 1034
(N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding church leaders contributorily liable for infringements
by local parishes); Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Pub., Inc., 456 F. Supp.
531 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 592 F.2d 651 (1977); Davis v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 240 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (holding television program sponsors contributorily liable for ability to supervise and control program content).
34. Two courts observed that a corporate officer may be liable as a contributory infringer if he personally participated in or directly derived financial benefit from the corporation's infringement, if he used the corporation to
accomplish the infringement, and/or he was a dominant influence in the corporation. Varon v. The Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 716, 718 (D.N.M.
1982); Famous Music Corp. v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding
Ass'n, 423 F. Supp. 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1976), affd, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir. 1977).
Other courts have apparently limited contributory infringement to those
situations in which the corporate officer took more than a mere passive role in
the infringing activity. See, e.g., United Feature Synd., Inc. v. Sunrise Mold Co.,
569 F. Supp. 147, 148 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (corporate officers liable for having
"caused and materially contributed to" the corporate infringements); Lauratex
Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(corporate officer "directly cause[d]" the corporate infringements); Milene Music, Inc. v. Gotauco, 551 F. Supp. 1288, 1295 (D.R.I. 1982) (stockholders and officers liable for contributory infringement had knowledge of the
infringements); Samet & Wells, Inc. v. Shalom Toy Co., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 895,
903-04 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (corporate president authorized and supervised infringing activity).
35. See supra notes 27 & 33 and accompanying text.
36. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963); Varon v. The Santa Fe Reporter, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 716, 718 (D.N.M. 1982);
M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412, 414 (E.D. Tenn. 1927); N. BooRSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW § 10:8 (1981); E. KITNER & J. LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW PRIMER 430-31 (2d ed. 1982).
37. These cases were so named because the defendants were proprietors of
establishments who provided live music for the entertainment of their guests.
The performances infringed musical copyrights. See, e.g., Famous Music Corp.
v. Bay State Harness Horse Racing and Breeding Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1213 (1st Cir.
1977) (horseracing track retained a band which infringed copyrights); Gershwin
Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971) (concert
promoter who did not participate in selecting programs); Dreamland Ball
Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 36 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1929) (owners of
dance halls were liable for infringements by orchestras they hired); Chess Music, Inc., v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184 (D. Minn. 1977) (restaurant owner who hired
band explicitly instructing them not to infringe copyrights); KECA Music, Inc.
v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (restaurant owner
hired a band who infringed copyrights despite explicit instructions by the owners that they should play only "original works"); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 425 F.
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These cases established that where the defendant had the "right or
ability to supervise" the infringing activity combined with a "direct
38
financial interest" in the activity, he was a contributory infringer.
Liability arises, therefore, despite the fact that the direct infringer
was an independent contractor 39 or was acting against the express
40
conditions of his employment.
The reshaping of respondeatsuperiorhas been compounded by
the contemporaneous existence of liability based on joint and several liability. Indeed, some courts have begun discussions of contributory infringement based on respondeat superior only to

4x
conclude with rhetoric more typical of joint and several liability.

This group of cases indicates a cross-semination of the two separate
legal doctrines.
ContributoryInfringement and Joint and Several Liability
The tort doctrine of joint and several liability is distinct from
respondeatsuperior as a foundation for contributory copyright infringement. 42 It focuses on the intentional actions of the defendant
Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y.) (owner of cabaret in which infringement occurred), affd
677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1976); M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic
Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 (D.Mass. 1960) (bar which retained a band as an independent contractor); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648
(W.D. La. 1942) (club hired a band who infringed despite a signed agreement
that they would not do so).
38. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir.
1963); Fourth Floor Music, Inc. v. Der Place, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 41, 43-44 (D.Neb.
1983); see Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc. 443 F.2d 1159,
1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Rodgers v. Quests, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q. 212, 214 (N.D. Ohio
1981); Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 (D. Minn. 1977) ("Those
who profit from copyrighted music are obliged to pay not only the piper but the
author."); but see F.E.L. Pub., Ltd. v. National Conf. of Cath. Bishops, 466 F.
Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding the defendants liable based on respondeat superior despite the lack of a "direct financial interest" in the acts of
infringement).
39. See, e.g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d
304, 307 (2d Cir. 1963); Dreamland Ball Room, Inc. v. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co.,
36 F.2d 354, 355 (7th Cir. 1929); M. Witmark & Sons v. Tremont Social & Athletic Club, 188 F. Supp. 787 (D. Mass. 1960).
40. See, e.g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971); Chess Music, Inc. v. Sipe, 442 F. Supp. 1184, 1185 (D. Minn.
1977); KECA Music, Inc. v. Dingus McGee's Co., 432 F. Supp. 72, 74 (W.D. Mo.
1977); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Veltin, 47 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. La. 1942).
41. See, e.g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971); F.E.L. Pub., Ltd. v. National Conf. of Cath. Bishops,
466 F. Supp. 1034, 1040 (N.D. Ill. 1978); see also, e.g., Bally Midway Mfg. Co. v.
25,601
American Postage Mach., Inc., 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH)
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 1983) (discussing joint and several liability with respect to an
ability to supervise the infringing activity).
42. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. American Invsco Mgmt., Inc., 217
U.S.P.Q. 1076, 1077 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (observing three distinct bases for infringement liability: direct infringement, liability for contribution to the infringe-
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which faciliated an act of direct infringement. 43 Under joint and
several liability, a third party who knowingly facilitated, caused, authorized, or materially contributed to an act of infringement is a
contributory infringer. 44 Unlike a contributory infringer liable
under respondeatsuperior,a third party jointly and severally liable
must knowingly participate and further the act of direct
45
infringement.
A few contributory copyright infringement cases predicated on
joint and several liability illustrate the requirement of knowing
participation. The defendant's acts in Kalem Co. v. HarperBrothers" demonstrate the extreme of knowing participation. The
Kalem contributory infringers produced a film version of a copyment, and liability arising from a relationship with the direct infringer).
Comparesupra notes 27 & 38-40 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine
of respondeatsuperior)with supra note 28 and infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (discussing joint and several liability).
43. See supra note 28 and accompanying text; infra note 44 and accompanying text.
44. E.g., Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (concert promoter induced infringements at concerts);
Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 365 (9th Cir. 1947)
(screen writer contributed to infringing exhibitions of a movie by incorporating
infringing material into them); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks,
558 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (W.D.N.Y. 1983) (school board "caused and materially
contributed to" school's infringing exhibition of audiovisual works by taping
them off the air and distributing them to schools for exhibition); MCA, Inc. v.
Wilson, 425 F. Supp. 443, 455-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (song writer liable for contributing copyrighted music for an infringing song); Johnson v. Salomon, 197
U.S.P.Q. 801, 829-30 (D. Minn. 1977) (salesman liable for causing infringing publication of infringing games and for promoting sales of those games); Screen
Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399, 403
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (agency which advertised and agency who packaged and
shipped infringing record albums were potentially liable for participating in or
furthering their sale).
45. See Schuchart & Assoc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) 25,593 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 1983); Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp.
v. Crooks, 558 F. Supp. 1247, 1256 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Aiken, Hazen Hoffman,
Miller, P.C. v. Empire Const. Co., 542 F. Supp. 252, 261-62 (D. Neb. 1982); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. American Invsco Mgmt., Inc., 217 U.S.P.Q. 1076, 107778 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F.
Supp. 429, 459-60 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 774 (1984); Johnson v. Salomon, 197 U.S.P.Q. 801, 829 (D. Minn. 1977); cf.
Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d
Cir. 1971) (observing that a party may be held jointly and severally liable based
on "vicarious liability," originally derived from respondeatsuperior,despite his
lack of knowledge, but later observing that one who knowingly "induces,
causes, or materially contributes to" an act of infringement is a "contributory
infringer"); Screen Gems-Columbia Music Corp. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc., 256 F.
Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (similarly observing no necessity for knowledge
to establish liability, but stating later that knowing participation establishes
joint and several liability).
46. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
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righted book and promoted its exhibition. 47 The Kalem Court observed that any further participation would necessarily have been
direct infringement. 48 The element of knowing and deliberate participation also existed in Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd
Corp.49 In Universal Pictures, a writer knowingly induced the infringing production and exhibition of a film when he deliberately
chose material knowing that it was copyrighted. 50 In Encyclopaedia BritannicaEducationalCorp. v. Crooks,51 a school board and its
members taped copyrighted televised works and distributed the
copies for infringing classroom exhibition. 52 Similarly, in Johnson
v. Salomon,53 the defendant intentionally induced the production
and sale of infringing copies of a game and its rule book. The defendant in Johnson also misrepresented certain facts to the direct
infringers so that the infringing activities would continue.54 Each
of these cases illustrates defendant's deliberate activities which
were clearly intended to "facilitate, cause, authorize, or materially
contribute to" 55 acts of direct infringement.'
Not all "knowing"
participation, however, is so active and deliberate.
Other cases demonstrate that a contributory infringer need not
have specifically intended for his actions to further the infringement. The defendant who knew or should have known of the infringing nature of the activity will be liable as a contributory
47. Id. at 60. Producing the movie version of the book was not direct infringement because it did not violate the express terms of the copyright statute.
Exhibition of the movie, however, was an act of infringement. Id at 61.
48. "If the defendant did not contribute to the infringement, it is impossible
to do so except by taking part in the final act. It is liable on principles recognized in every part of the law." Id. at 63. The Court found that the defendant
"not only expected but invoked" the direct infringement. Id. This case is of
particular interest because of the Court's observations regarding contributory
infringement by providing the means. See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying
text.
49. 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1947).
50. Id. at 365. The court observed that the writer acted on his own; he was
not directed by his employer to appropriate the infringing material. Id. at 366
(emphasizing the deliberateness of the defendant writer's actions).
51. 558 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D.N.Y. 1983).
52. Id. at 1256.
53. 197 U.S.P.Q. 801 (D. Minn. 1977).
54. The defendant led the direct infringers to believe that a license to produce the games and rules books was still valid. Id. at 815, 829-30.
55. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
56. In Electra Records Co. v. Gem Electronic Dist., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 821
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), the court considered similar facts when granting the plaintiff's
prayer for a preliminary injunction. The Electra Records defendants operated a
record store at which they sold blank cassette tapes, loaned original copies of
copyrighted recordings, and maintained a machine upon which customers could
make infringing copies for a small fee. Id. at 822-23. This court observed that
the defendants' activities were commercial exploitation prohibited by the copyright statute. Id. This court did not otherwise engage in the traditional contributory infringement analysis.
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infringer. 57 The contributions of the defendants in Screen GemsColumbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.58 were not so clearly
deliberate. The defendant advertising agency promoted sales and
the defendant mail order agency filled orders for infringing sound
recordings.5 9 Despite the defendants' lack of actual knowledge of
infringing nature of these recordings, the court imputed knowledge
of the direct infringements to the defendants. 6° The infringer in
Gershwin PublishingCorp. v. ColumbiaArtists Management,Inc.61
promoted concerts at which infringing material was played. 62 The
court imputed knowledge based on the defendants' preparation of
the concert programs prior to the performances.6 3 Therefore, a
party who facilitates copyright infringement is a contributory infringer where a reasonable basis exists for imputing knowledge of
the direct infringement."
A defendant who does not know and has no reasonable basis to
know that his actions facilitate acts of infringement, on the other
hand, is not a contributory infringer. In Schuchart & Associates v.
57. See, e.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi Records, Inc.,
256 F. Supp. 399, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("each defendant was aware or should
have been aware"); Gershwin Pub. Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443
F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Screen Gems with approval). That the
defendant "knew or should have known" is a prerequisite to joint and several
liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 877 (1977). Observe that this
is different from strict liability which would not examine evidence of knowledge or a reasonable basis for knowledge. See supra note 19. This element of
knowledge is also important to the patent law staple article of commerce doctrine. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
58. 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
59. Id at 401-02.
60. The court held that each of these defendants knew of should have
known of the infringing nature of the record sales by mail order. Id. at 403.
The court observed that the advertising agency had sufficient business expertise
in the music industry to have realized that the records sold were infringing copies. They sold for an unusually low price, and the "smallness, lack of permanent location, and financial unreliability" of the direct infringer should have
alerted this defendant. Id at 404. The court denied the defendants' motion for
summary judgement. Id at 405 (also denying the motion of the mail order shipping agent because it found that a similar issue of fact remained as to the
knowledge of that defendant).
61. 443 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1971). A part of this court's analysis considered
contributory infringement based on respondeatsuperior,but it based its holding at least in part on joint and several liability. See Id at 1162-63.
62. Id. at 1162. Another division of the defendant managed and booked the
bands for the performances at which the infringements occurred. Id, at 1160.
The court found that separate division vicariously liable. Id. at 1162-63. Despite
the separate analysis given to the issue of contributory liability for this separate
division and the fact that liability lay on a separate basis, it is impossible to
determine whether the outcomes of the two issues were wholly independent.
63. Id at 1161.
64. The Supreme Court recently held that constructive knowledge is insufficient to establish liability for contributory infringement. See infra notes 70-72
and accompanying text. This holding conflicts with prior case law. See supra
note 57 and accompanying text.
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Solo Serve Corp.,65 the court noted that a defendant who provides a
copyrighted work to another who makes infringing copies of it is
not a contributory infringer if he does so innocent of any knowledge
of the other parties' intended illegitimate use. 66 In Aiken, Hazen,
Hoffman, Miller, P.C v. Empire Construction Co., 6 7 the court also
observed that the defendants' ignorance of the infringing act would
have precluded liability for contributory infringement.6s The defendants in these cases had no reason to believe their contributions
would result in copyright infringement.6 9 Liability for contributory
copyright infringement, therefore, requires at least some reasonable basis from which the court might impute knowledge to the defendant of his facilitation of copyright infringement.
In a recent case, Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,70 the United States Supreme Court held that "construc-

tive knowledge"7 1 was insufficient to hold a defendant liable for
contributory copyright infringement. 72 The Sony Court observed

65. 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,593 (W.D. Tex. June 28, 1983).
66. Id.(citing 1 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.11(A) (1983) with approval).
The Schuchart defendants had no knowledge of the copyright infringements
until the copyright owner filed the action alleging contributory infringement.
I& They provided original copies of copyrighted designs and specifications to an
architectural firm which copied them. They legitimately transferred the originals to act as a "guideset" for a building project. Id.
67. 542 F. Supp. 252 (D. Neb. 1982).
68. Id,at 262. The defendant provided infringing copies of copyrighted architects' drawings and specifications to a professional engineer for certification.
The court held that this activity had nothing to do with subsequent infringement of those drawings. Id Nevertheless, the court fully analyzed the contributory infringement issue. Id at 261-62 (separately considering "contributory
infringement"--.e., joint and several liability--and "vicarious liability"--Le., liability derived from respondeat superior).
69. See Schuchart, 1983 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,593; Aiken, 542 F. Supp.
at 262.
70. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
71. Where the defendant could have known a fact by the exercise of reasonable diligence, he is deemed to have known it as a matter of law. BLACK's LAW
DICIONARY 284 (5th ed. 1979).
72. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 787. It is difficult to determine what constitutes the
type of reasonable basis for knowledge for which the Sony Court would impose
liability. It is possible that the prospective lawful uses for the Sony video cassette recorder were so significant in relation to any foreseeable infringing uses
that such illegitimate use, although probable, would not have been intended by
the defendants. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 786 (observing that the video recorder
involved in Sony was capable of lawful uses, whereas the movie in Kalem Co. v.
HarperBros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911), was capable only of infringing use). Note, however, the foreseeability of infringing use of the recorder constitutes a reasonable
basis for imputing knowledge to the defendant of such infringing use. See supra
notes 57-64 and accompanying text. A lack of intent to facilitate copyright infringement does not constitute a lack of knowledge, constructive or actual, that
purchasers of a copying device will likely use it to infringe copyrighted works.
A lack of intent is immaterial in determining culpability for contributory copyright infringement, see supra note 19, but a lack of any basis for imputed knowledge is decisive. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
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that the closest analogy to contributory liability based on constructive knowledge was contributory patent infringement. 73 It observed that contributory patent infringement includes the staple
article of commerce doctrine 74 which precludes liability where the
article sold was "suitable for substantial noninfringing use." 75 The
Sony Court held that the staple article of commerce doctrine must
"balance the interests," of the copyright owner in his works against
those of the defendant in the sale of goods and, impliedly, against
those of the public at large. 76 In so holding, the Sony Court transcended the traditional analysis for contributory copyright infringement,77 and incorporated the staple article of commerce doctrine.
This incorporation has begun to have an impact on the law of con78
tributory copyright infringement.
ContributoryInfringement By Providing The Means
In Kalem Co. v. HarperBrothers,79 the defendant distributed a
film based on a copyrighted novel.8 0 Liability rested on the defendant's knowing, intentional acts which brought about copyright infringement.8' The Court also considered the nature of the article
73. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 788. But see infra notes 109, 119 & 134-37 and accompanying text (discussing contributory patent infringement and the requirement
of "knowledge").
74. See supra note 7; infra notes 135-37.
75. Sony, 104 S.Ct. at 788.
76. Id at 789.
77. Such traditional analysis was twofold. The court could determine that
the defendant had the right or ability to control or supervise the infringing activity combined with a direct financial interest in it. See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing liability derived from respondeatsuperior). The
central focus of this inquiry is the relationship of the defendant with the direct
infringer and with the unlawful profit from the infringement. See supra note
32 and accompanying text. The court could otherwise determine that the defendant had knowingly caused, induced, authorized, or otherwise materially
contributed to the direct infringement. See supra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text (discussing liability based on joint and several liability). The emphasis
of this approach is the knowledge and actions of the defendant which contributed to the direct infringement. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. The
staple article of commerce doctrine focuses on the nature of the means of infringement provided by the defendant. See infra notes 120 & 133-37 and accompanying text.
78. See RCA Records, Inc. v. All-Fast Systems, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 631-CSH
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1984) (distinguishing Sony) (slip opinion).
79. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
80. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussion of the Kalem
case).
81. See supra notes 47 & 48 and accompanying text. This is the traditional
basis for contributory infringement evolved from joint and several liability. See
supra notes 43 & 44 and accompanying text. The focus and tenor of the Court's
analysis exhibits this, despite dicta regarding "ordinary articles of commerce."
See infra note 82. The Kalem Court further illustrated that the intent of the
sale was the material factor involved. It observed that constructive knowledge,
see supra note 71, that a buyer may use the commodity for illegal purposes was
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sold important only to the extent that it could imply the intent of
its sale.8 2 Therefore, it was not solely on the basis of the nature of
83
the article sold that the Court held the defendant liable.
Other courts have also considered the nature of the article sold
as a factor in determining the defendant's intent. The Midway
ManufacturingCo. v. Strohon8 4 court held that the seller of a video
game modification kit was not a contributory infringer. This court
concluded that mere anticipation that purchasers would use it to
infringe copyrights was insufficient to demonstrate intent.8 5 Such
misuse was not the "most conspicuous use" for the kit or the use
"intended, expected, encouraged, and . ..the source of the product's consumer appeal. 86 The court did not hold the seller responsible for the misuse of the kit without such actual knowledge of the
8
purchaser's infringing use.

7

Similarly, the court in OriginalAppalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Cradle Creations,Inc.,88 compared the defendant's intent with the
nature of the article sold. The OriginalAppalachianArtworks defendants sold a pattern book for making copies of a copyrighted
doll. The court granted a preliminary injunction against the sale of
the book because its nature made the defendants aware that purchasers would use it to infringe copyrights.8 9 The focus of the Original Appalachian Artworks, Kalem, and the Midway
Manufacturing courts remained on the intent or knowledge of the
insufficient to make the seller liable. See supra note 72. It further noted, however, that sale with the intent that the buyer use it illegally would make the
seller liable. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62 [citations omitted] (using the illustration of
illegal liquor sales).
82. The Court found that the "most conspicuous purpose" for the sale of the
Kalem film was infringing exhibition. Kalem, 222 U.S. at 62-63. It further observed, however, that "where an ordinary article of commerce is sold nice questions arise as to the point at which the seller becomes an accomplice in
subsequent illegal use by the buyer." I&L at 62. Such an examination of the
nature of the articles sold is not unusual where courts choose to draw an inference of culpable intent from its sale. See generally Direct Sales Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 703, 710-12 (1943) (sale of narcotics by a drug distributor); infra
note 120 (discussing the original focus of the staple article inquiry in patent
law).
83. The primary focus of this analysis was that for determining joint and
several liability. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing joint
and several liability). The focus which considers the nature of the article sold
by the defendant is the staple article of commerce doctrine. See supra notes 7 &
73-75 and accompanying text; infra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (discussing the staple article of commerce doctrine in copyright law).
84. 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
85. Id at 748. The court observed the dearth of evidence to indicate what
purchasers would do with the modification kit when they bought it. Id.
86. Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d
963, 975 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984)).
87. Id. [citation omitted].
88. 1982 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,387 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 27, 1982).
89. Id.
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defendants. This is consistent with the traditional contributory infringement analysis.9° The case law, however, includes limited examples of a departure from the traditional analysis.
Two pre-Sony cases focused on the nature of the article sold as
a primary means of determining liability for contributory infringement, but departed from the traditional analysis. In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Arctic International,Inc.,91 the court held that

copyright law would not permit the defendant to "reap the benefits
of plaintiff's artistic endeavor" 92 by selling a video game conversion
kit. The court found that the defendant would effectively misappropriate some value from the plaintiff's copyrights if the device's
value was exclusively derived from the plaintiff's games. The court
also held, however, that if the device was useful on all video games,
then the modification kit would have its own inherent independent
value and its sale would be permissible. 93 Had the Arctic International court employed this reasoning, it would not have based a final decision on the intent or knowledge of the defendant; rather, it
would have extended or denied liability solely on the basis of the
nature of the article provided. 94 This approach is inconsistent with
95
the traditional contributory copyright infringement analysis.
In another case, the Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group,Inc.,96 defend-

ants sold a device for copying video game cartridges. The court
found that while the device was capable of some uses that did not
involve the copying of the plaintiff's games these uses were minor.
In granting a preliminary injunction against its sale,97 the court
held that the defendant's device for copying video game cartridges
90. See supra notes 31-40 & 42-69 and accompanying text (discussing contributory copyright infringement evolved from respondeat superior and joint
and several liability, respectively).

91. 211 U.S.P.Q. 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
92. Id at 1159-60. This court was protecting the copyright owner's exclusive
right to capitalize on his works. See supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text
(discussing the copyright owner's interest in his works).
93. Arctic Intl, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 1159-60. This inquiry was similar to the staple article of commerce inquiry--examining whether significant noninfringing
uses exist for the article. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text (discussing the Sony decision); infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the
Atari decision); infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text (discussing the staple
article of commerce doctrine as codified in patent law).
94. The court's emphasis on the potential appropriation of the value of the
defendant's copyrights indicates that the court would have balanced the interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public in reaching a final decision.
See supra note 76; infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text. Whether the
modification device was useable on other games or not would have had no effect
on its impact to the value of the plaintiff's copyrights. Use on other games
would have meant appropriation of their value also; it would not necessarily
have rendered the device a "staple article." See supra note 120.
95. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
96. 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983).
97. Id
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must be capable of "substantial noninfringing use" to preclude injunctive relief against its sale. 98 As it did in the Arctic International case, 99 the court in Atari abandoned the traditional
contributory infringement analysis.
The common factor in Atari, Arctic International,and Sony
was the recognition of a potential public interest in noninfringing
10 0
use of the means of infringement provided by the defendants.
The courts focused primarily on the nature of the article sold rather
than on any relationship between the defendants and an act of direct infringement. 10 1 This analysis is analogous to that employed in
patent law under similar circumstances. It also includes the staple
article of commerce doctrine which precludes liability where the
defendant sold an article capable of significant noninfringing
10 2
uses.
98. Id, This inquiry is central to the staple article of commerce doctrine as
employed in patent law. See infra notes 134-37. This is the approach subsequently adopted by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984). See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying
text.
99. See supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
100. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 788-89; Atari, 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at 25,613
(finding that customers would not buy the article for its lawful uses, the court
found that the public interest is best served by restraining its sale); Arctic Int7,
211 U.S.P.Q. at 1160 (the article may be capable of use in connection with a
number of video games). See infra notes 127-30 & 132-38 and accompanying
text (discussing the public interest involved in patent law and the staple article
of commerce doctrine, respectively).
101. The Sony Court first concluded that the defendants were not contributory infringers under the traditional analysis in that they lacked the requisite
knowledge or ability to control the infringing activity, and then observed that
the only way the defendants could be liable for contributory infringement
would be under that doctrine as employed in patent law. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at
788. The Atari court considered the nature of the article sold, despite the concededly knowing nature of its sale. See Atari, 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. at
25,613. The Arctic Int'7 court would have examined the nature of the article to
determine whether the defendants primarily intended it for copying the plaintiff's copyrighted games. See Arctic Intl, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 1159-60. The difference between the use of the staple article of commerce doctrine in Sony and its
use in the other two cases is subtle, but important. The Sony Court's finding
that liability could not arise under the traditional analysis should have ended its
inquiry. The Court, however, considered the significance of any noninfringing
uses for the video recorder involved. See supra note 71-76 and accompanying
text. The Sony Court would therefore have extended liability beyond the traditional bounds of contributory copyright infringement if it had found the article
involved incapable of substantial noninfringing uses. The Arctic Intl and Atari
courts would have limited liability for contributory infringement by using the
staple article test. See supra notes 91-94 & 96-98 and accompanying text (discussing the Arctic Intl and Atari decisions, respectively). The latter approach
is more typical of the staple article of commerce doctrine of patent law. See
infra notes 134-38 and accompanying text (discussing the staple article of commerce doctrine in patent law).
102. See infra notes 120 & 136 and accompanying text.
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CONTRIBUTORY PATENT INFRINGEMENT AND THE STAPLE ARTICLE
OF COMMERCE DOCTRINE
0 3s

Patent law
and copyright lawl ° 4 both exist on the same con10 5
stitutional basis.
Violation of the patent owner's exclusive
rights' 6 constitutes a patent infringement.10 7 The prohibition
against contributory patent infringement, unlike contributory copyright infringement, 0 8 is found in the patent statute. 0 9 Contributory patent infringement also includes considerations alien to
copyright law;" 0 however, it was once a judically-created doctrine
103. 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376 (1982).
104. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
105. See supra note 11 (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 U.S. 774, 787
(1984) (close kinship); Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 131 (1932); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 656-57 (1834) (common origin). The Supreme
Court, however, has noted significant differences between the two and stated
that precedent in one area does not necessarily apply to the other. See, e.g.,
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954); Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S.
339, 345-46 (1908).
106.

others
States
107.
(a)

"Every patent shall ...

grant to the patentee ...

the right to exclude

from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United
..
" 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982).
The patent statute provides:
[W]hoever without authority makes, uses or sells any patented inven-

tion ...

infringes the patent.

(b) Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an
infringer.
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a
patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfiringing use, shall be liable as a contributory
infringer.
(d) No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed misuse
or illegal extension of the patent right by ... [exercising or enforcing exclusive rights over a nonstaple, nonpatented article described in subsection
(c) above].
35 U.S.C. § 271 (1982) [emphasis added].
108. See supra notes 1, 22, 24 & 25 (discussing contributory copyright
infringement).
109. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
110. Patent protection can exist in an article, in an assemblage of non-patented articles, or in a method for using non-patented articles. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) (1982). Contributory patent infringement includes the sale of non-patented articles where such use infringes the patent which comprises them. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982); see also infra note 120 (discussing the staple-nonstaple
article distinction). The doctrine of patent misuse counterbalances contributory
patent infringement. The staple article of commerce doctrine is the statutory
center of balance. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) & (d) (1982).
Contributory copyright infringement does not involve the provision of component articles of the copyright; it involves facilitation of infringement in other
ways. The issue of copyright misuse has only arisen in the context of tying the
licensing of copyrighted works to the licensing of other works. See United
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similar to contributory copyright infringement.,
In an early contributory patent infringement case, the court in
Wallace v. Holmes, 1 2 recognized that effective enforcement of patent rights required relief against a person who merely facilitated
another's act of infringement."13 Where the case involves a combination patent" i 4 or a process patent,"i 5 the only practicable remedy
available to protect the interests of the patent owner is an action
against the seller of the nonpatented material components of his
invention."l 6 Contributory patent infringement evolved from such

situations where the defendant sold a material part of a combinaStates v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45-48 (1962) (anti-trust case); United States v.
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) (anti-trust case). The issue of misuse has possibly not arisen in the same way in copyright law because copyright
owners do not have the same power as patentees to include non-protected articles within the scope of their exclusive rights. Where the issue is contributory
copyright infringement for providing the means, however, it is possible that a
copyright owner could extend his exclusive rights so far as to control the availability of an article not included in the copyright grant. See Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 778-89 (1984). Nevertheless, in the
patent setting, the article over which the patent owner has effective control
constitutes at least an essential component of the patented invention. See 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). This is impossible for copyrights which do not include
the physical object embodying the concept, but only include its particular form
of expression. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18 (1954).
111. See infra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
112. 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100); see Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 73, 76 (1982).
113. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80 (the patent owner would otherwise be "driven
to the task of searching out the individual purchasers"--ie., they would be
"helpless and remediless"); see infra note 116 and accompanying text. The
Wallace defendant owned the patent for an oil burning lamp assembly-none
of the parts of which were patented. The defendant sold the innovative base
which purchasers could combine with a readily available glass chimney to complete an infringing lantern. Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 79-80.
114. A combination patent is an assemblage of non-patented components
which, taken as a whole, is protected under patent law. See, e.g., Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (none of the components
of a shrimp deveining machine were patenable individually); Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961) (patented convertible top protected as a whole, but not its cloth component); Bliss & Laughlin
Ind., Inc. v. Bil-Jax, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 577, 580 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (components of
scaffolding not protected, but assembled whole was); Watsco, Inc. v. Henry
Valve Co., 232 F. Supp. 38, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (self-tapping valve not protected
without removable tool).
115. See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 181-82
(1980) (non-patented chemical for use in a patented process as a pesticide); B.B.
Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 496-97 (1942) (non-patented compound for use
in a patented cold bonding process).
116. E.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 197-98 (1980);
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 80; See, e.g., Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1944) (denial of protection against the sale of a nonpatented, nonstaple article for use in a patented combination-at the zenith of
the doctrine of patent misuse); see also infra notes 125-31 and accompanying
text (discussing the doctrine of patent misuse).
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tion or process patent for infringing completion by the purchaser. 117

Contributory patent infringement was similar to contributory copyright infringement;11 8 it was the knowing facilitation of an act of
direct infringement. 1 9
The scope of contributory patent infringement increased, however, until it precluded the sale of staple articles 20 to patent licensees in Henry Co. v. A.B. Dick Co. 12 1 This decision gave birth to
widespread efforts by patentees to control the markets for non-pat117. See, e.g., Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 80 F. 712, 720
(6th Cir. 1897) (sale of unpatented, nonstaple switch and trolley for use in a
patented electric streetcar); Wallace, 29 F. Cas. at 79-80 (sale of non-patented,
non-staple burner for assembly into a patented combination lantern); Roberts,
ContributoryInfringement of PatentRights, 12 HARv. L. REV. 35, 38-40 (1898).
118. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.

119. This has remained the basic definition of contributory patent infringement. See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacements Co., 377 U.S. 476,
488 (1964) (requires sale of article knowing that it is especially for use in conjunction with a patented combination); Fuller Co. v. Metal Arts Co., 276 F.
Supp. 605, 610 (S.D. Tex. 1966) (defendant had actual knowledge of patent and
of infringements); Freedman v. Friedman, 142 F. Supp. 426, 429 (D. Md. 1956);
("knowing" means actual knowledge, not constructive knowledge); 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(c) (1982); but see supra note 71 (defining constructive knowledge). This is
similar to contributory copyright infringement based on joint and several liability. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. Observe, however, that the
staple article of commerce doctrine operates to exclude some forms of knowing
facilitation from contributory infringement. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
120. A staple article is a non-patented article for use in conjunction with a
patented machine, process, or combination which is not an integral part of the
machine, process, or combination. See Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastner Co. v.
Eureka Speciality Co., 77 F. 288, 289 (6th Cir. 1896). The staple-nonstaple distinction focuses on the potential range of uses for an object. The traditional
staple article of commerce inquiry in patent law begins by determining the
knowledge or intent of the defendant. It then examines the nature of the article sold to determine two qualities of the article. The first determination is
whether the article is incapable of non-infringing use. The second is whether
the article embodies the essence of the patented invention's advance over prior
art. See Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and
Metamorphosis, 44 U. Pirr. L. REV. 73, 84-88 (1982). The original purpose for
judicial examination of the staple-nonstaple character of an article was to determine whether the seller had notice of the fact that it would be used to infringe a
patent. Id. at 88-89; see, e.g., Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 79-80 (C.C. Conn.
1871) (No. 17,100). This is similar to the focus of contributory copyright infringement derived from joint and several liability. See supra notes 43, 44 & 7990 and accompanying text.
121. 224 U.S. 1 (1912). The A.B. Dick patentee licensed the use of its patented mimeograph machine to use only in conjunction with supplies which it
sold. The defendant sold ink not included in the patent grant to one of the
licensees for use with the machine. Id. at 11-12. The Court reasoned that the
patentee has the right to either license the use of the patent or to withhold its
use from all. Id, at 17-18. It therefore concluded that the patentee had the right
to expressly limit the use to whatever scope it desired because ownership of the
machine and the right to use it were severable. Id at 19, 24-25. The Court held
that the sale of supplies to an owner of a patented device subject to an express
license limitation, in violation of that license, constituted contributory patent
infringement. Id. at 31-35.
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ented, staple articles by restrictively licensing their patented inventions.' 22 Because patent rights, unlike copyrights, include the
exclusive right to use the invention,1 23 contributory patent infringement included supplying staple articles to patent licensees for use
24
in conjunction with patented inventions.'
The patent owners' abusive use of restrictive licenses i 25 gave
rise to the contravening doctrine of "patent misuse.' 26 This doctrine limited contributory infringement and was predicated on an
aversion to an expanded patent monopoly.' 27 It began when the
Supreme Court limited the practice of restrictive licensing by patentees and, consequently, the doctrine of contributory infringement, through its decision in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co.' 28 This decision excluded the unlicensed
122. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 191 (1980) (observing the impact of the A.B. Dick decision); Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. P=TT. L. REV. 73,
77 (1982); see, e.g., Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty
Co., 77 F. 288, 296-97 (6th Cir. 1896) (the monopoly over the non-patented staple
is an incident of the patent grant and anyone inducing a breach of the patent
license by sale of such articles is a contributory infringer); but see Cortelyou v.
Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196, 199-201 (1907) (facts similar to those
of A.B. Dick, but without actual knowledge that sale of ink violated a patent
license-no liability).
123. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) with 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
124. See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1912) (sale of non-patented, staple ink to licensee of patented mimeograph machine, knowing that
the licensee would breach the restrictive license and thereby infringe the patent); Cortelyou v. Charles Eneu Johnson & Co., 207 U.S. 196, 199-200 (1907)
(sale of ink); Rupp & Wittgenfeld Co. v. Elliott, 131 F. 730 (6th Cir. 1904) (sale of
non-patented, nonstaple wire for use in violation of restrictive license); Oddi,
Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis,
44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 77 (1982).
125. Under a restrictive convenant, the patent owner would sell its patented
machine with the express condition that the buyer could use it only with supplies provided by the patentee. The patent owner would attempt to profit from
the sale of those supplies in this way. See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 29-30 (1931) (manufacturer of dry ice who owned
the patent to a cold-pack container did not license or manufacturer container,
but attempted to restrict its use to its own non-patented, staple dry ice); Motion
Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 506 (1917) (owner
of patent for motion picture projector attempted to restrict its use to use only
with its own non-patented films).
126. Oddi, ContributoryInfringement/PatentMisuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 73, 77-79 (1982). The Supreme Court named
this doctrine patent misuse in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488,
493 (1942), and pronounced its equitable nature. Id.at 491-92.
127. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppinger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 505, 514-17 (1917).
128. 243 U.S. 502 (1917). The Motion PicturePatents plaintiff manufactured
and sold a motion picture projector under an express license for use only in
conjunction with non-patented films which the plaintiff-licensor sold. Id.at
506-07. The defendant sold films to owners of the machine. Id. at 507-08. The
Court reasoned that patent law protects the patentee's exclusive rights solely
for the public benefit-not to provide for private fortunes. Id. at 510-11. The
Court held that if the patent owner has any right to restrict the use of its pat-
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provision of staple articles to patent licensees from the doctrine of
129
contributory infringement.
Subsequent to the Motion Picture Patents decision, the doctrine of patent misuse expanded, further limiting the doctrine of
contributory patent infringement, until the "Mercoid" cases. 130 In
those cases, the Supreme Court held that the patent owner could
not limit the availability of non-patented, nonstaple articles which
131
had no other use than to infringe his patent rights.
As a result of the demise of contributory infringement, Congress codified a test to balance patent misuse and contributory infringement. 3 2 The patent statute balances both to define the limits
of each.' 3 3 Under the statute, contributory patent infringement reent, then it derives from the general law and not from patent law. Id. at 513. It
found the patent owner's attempt to control non-patented, staple articles
through the patent license oppresive and unlawful. Id, at 517-18 (observing that
Congress had acted since the A.B. Dick decision to make attempts to lessen
competition unlawful); see Clayton Act § 3, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982)). The Motion Pictures Patents Court expressly overruled its earlier A.B. Dick decision. Motion Pictures Patents, 243

U.S. at 518.

129. Motion PicturesPatents,243 U.S. at 512-14. The Motion PicturePatents
decision prohibited the extension of the patent grant to supplies for use in conjunction with the patent which were not part of the patent. Id. at 516.
130. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. (1944) (Mercoid 1); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680
(1944) (Mercoid 11).

Prior to the Mercoid cases, the doctrine of patent misuse gradually expanded from its beginning in the Motion Picture Patents decision. The
Supreme Court first prohibited a patentee from profiting indirectly from its
patent by tying sales of a nonstaple article that was essential to the operation of
the patent. Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Pat. Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33
(1931) (prohibition of tying not dependent on nature of article or its use--staple
dry ice for use in patented refrigerated shipping container); J.C. Ferguson Mfg.
Works, Inc. v. American Lecithin Co., 94 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir. 1938) (relying on
Carbice-staplelecithin for use in patented recipe). The Court subsequently
extended the doctrine to nonstaple articles in B.B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S.
495 (1942) (relying on Carbice-extending the doctrine to non-patented, nonstaple latex emulsion for use in a patented cold bonding process).
131. The Mercoid cases involved combination patents. See supra note 114.
The defendants sold nonstaple components which were the "heart" of the patent. These articles were not capable of non-infringing use. Mercoid I, 320 U.S.
at 666-67; Mercoid II, 320 U.S. at 684. The Court denied recovery because the
doctrine of patent misuse precluded inclusion of any non-patented articles into
the patent monopoly. Mercoid 1, 320 U.S. at 665-66; Mercoid II, 320 U.S. at 684.
The articles must have been within the patent grant itself to be afforded protection-i.e., there was no such thing as contributory infringement to protect the
patentee against indirect invasion of his exclusive rights.
132. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797 (1952) (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 271(c) & (d) (1982)); see supra note 107.
133. To save the doctrine of contributory infringement from oblivion, Congress cut back the doctrine of patent misuse. Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm. &
Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1980). By defining in the negative what is not
contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982), and what is not patent misuse, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (1982), the statute embodies a balance between the two.

19851

Staple Article of Commerce

quires the knowing sale1 3 4 of a nonstaple article especially suited

for patent infringement.135 The staple article of commerce doctrine
specifically excludes from the doctrine of contributory infringe' 6
ment those articles capable of "substantial noninfringing use,"'
even where the defendant intended to facilitate acts of patent infringement. 137 Therefore, the statutory staple article of commerce
doctrine severely limits the scope of contributory patent infringement.13 So severe a limitation to contributory infringement is inappropriate to copyright law. 139 The principle embodied in the staple
article of commerce doctrine as employed by the Supreme Court in
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,'140 however,
should prove a useful addition to the law of contributory copyright
infringement.
AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS FOR CASES INVOLVING
CONTRIBUTORY INFRINGEMENT BY PROVIDING THE
MEANS

Contributory copyright infringement arose from contributory
patent infringement, 141 but its developmental history has diverged
It is not necessary to mitigate the impact of either doctrine because the staple
article of commerce doctrine encompasses both. See Dawson, 448 U.S. at 200-01.
134. See supra note 119.
135. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
136. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). See supra note 107.
137. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982). See, e.g., Dawson Chem. Co. v. Robhn & Haas
Co. 448 U.S. 176, 185, 200-01 (1980); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement, Co., 377 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1964); Oddi, ContributoryInfringement/Patent
Misuse: Metaphysics and Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 73, 82-85 (1982).
138. The knowing facilitation of an act of patent infringement now further
requires that the article provided has no significant noninfringing uses. See
supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text. This scope is more restrictive than
that of traditional contributory copyright infringement derived from joint and
several liability. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
139. The doctrine of contributory copyright infringement derived from joint
and several liability makes a third party liable for his knowing facilitation of an
act of infringement. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. There is no
reason to deny liability for such knowing facilitation in all cases merely because
the means of infringement were capable of significant noninfringing uses. To
do so would cause the absurd result that a third party knowingly providing a
photocopying machine, a tape recorder, or other such implement for infringing
use would always escape liability for his actions. This could create a grave injustice, and defeat the purposes of copyright protection. See supra notes 11-15 and
accompanying text.
140. 104 S.Ct. 774 (1984). The Sony decision signifies that a court should
consider all of the facts of a case before imposing liability for contributory copyright infringement. The court considering these facts should consider the interest of the alleged infringer to engage in substantially unrelated areas of
commerce, the public interest in the legitimate use of the means of copyright
infringement provided by the defendant, and the interest of the copyright
owner in effective protection of his works. See supra note 76 and accompanying
text.
141. See supra note 24.
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from that of contributory patent infringement."42 Contributory
43
copyright infringement remains a judically-created doctrine,
144
whereas Congress codified contributory patent infringement.
The staple article of commerce doctrine of patent law prevents the
patentee's misuse of the patent grant.145 The staple article of commerce doctrine adopted into copyright law should prevent such
overextension of the copyright grant, but it should also act to prevent damage to this grant where liability for contributory infringe46
ment would not otherwise lie.'
Contributory copyright infringement serves the same purpose
in copyright law that contributory patent infringement does in patent law.' 47 It renders a third party liable for facilitating an act of
infringement performed by another. 48 Contributory copyright infringement provides a means for the courts to go beyond the express provisions of the copyright statute and to prevent impairment
of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner. 149 In this way, it adi5 °
vances the purpose for copyright protection.
The traditional focus of contributory copyright infringement is
either on the defendant's actions which facilitated the infringement' 5 i or on his relationship to the direct infringers. i 52 This simple, direct analysis has afforded protection to copyrights for a long
time and in a variety of factual situations.1 53 It falls short of considering all interests involved, however, where the defendant provided
142. Contributory copyright infringement evolved from both joint and several liability and respondeatsuperior. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying
text. Contributory patent infringement applies more specifically to situations
were the defendant provided a material component of the actual patented invention and the only practicable means available for enforcing the patent rights
lies in an action against the contributory infringer. See supra notes 116 & 117
and accompanying text.

143. See supra notes 19 & 21-23 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 125-29 & 132-38.
146. See supra note 101.
147. Compare supra note 116 and accompanying text with infra notes 149 &
150 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 38 & 44 and accompanying text.
149. The copyright statute does not expressly proscribe contributory infringement, but it protects the copyrights involved from infringement by making a third party liable for his facilitation of the infringement. See supra notes
38 & 44 and accompanying text. This presents greater flexibility to the copyright owner to remedy infringement of his rights.
150. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
151. This is the focus of contributory infringement derived from joint several
liability. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
152. iThis is the focus of contributory infringement derived from the agency
doctrine of respondeatsuperior. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
153. See generally supra notes 33-40 & 46-90.
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the means for copyright infringement.1 54
Where the defendant provides the means for infringement, a
court holding that the defendant is a contributory infringer would
necessarily limit access to and/or use of his device.' 5 5 Such a holding would deprive the defendant of the fruit of his creative enterprise or industry.156 If this device is capable of legitimate and
beneficial use apart from its use for copyright infringement,'l5 7 the
158
court would effectively deprive society of its potential benefits.
This result under a traditional contributory infringement analysis is
distasteful to all but the copyright owner, who could obtain a wind159
fall through such a holding.
If, for example, the Sony' 60 Court had found that the defendants possessed actual knowledge of a significant likelihood 16 1 that
users of its video cassette recorder would use it to make copies of
copyrighted works off the air,162 the Court would have limited the
availability of this useful device.163 This would have contravened a
basic social policy favoring expanded access to broadcast works' 64
and denied the defendants any profit from developing their advance
154. Where the defendant provided the means for copyright infringement,
his interest in providing the means of infringement for legitimate purposes and
the public interest in access to the means of infringement for noninfringing use
become involved in the balance. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. Access to the means of infringement is not a consideration under the traditional
analysis. See supra notes 38 & 44 and accompanying text.
155. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 788
(1984) (observing an aversion in patent law to holding the device within the
control of the patent grant unless it is "unsuited for any commercial noninfringing use") [citation ommitted].
156. Two possible deprivations are the outright prohibition of the provision
of the article, or the imposition of a compulsory license on the defendant to
permit him to continue his activities. See Note, Every Home Should Have One:
The Betamax as a Staple Article of Commerce in Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Sony Corp. of America, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 209, 225-29 (1982); see also Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 463 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
157. This inquiry is one of degree. An article may have only minor noninfringing uses or uses of significant public value. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 788-91 (1984).
158. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774, 795
(1984) (observing a public interest in the increased availability of televised programs made possible through a video cassette recorder used to infringe copyrighted works).
159. The copyright owners would effectively control the market for the
means of infringement. See supra notes 155 & 156 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
161. Actual knowledge does not include the "constructive knowledge" that
the Sony Court held was insufficient to establish liability for contributory infringement. See supra notes 71 & 72 and accompanying text.
162. This determination would establish contributory infringement based on
joint and several liability. See supra notes 44 & 45 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 156 & 159 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 158.
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in technology.1 6 5 This would have been an undesireable result. If,
on the other hand, the Court had found that use of the recorder
would significantly diminish the value of televised audiovisual
works, l'6 then to allow its continued availability would have denied
the very purposes for copyright protection. 167 This is an equally un16 8
desireable result.
A court, therefore, cannot permit the continued provision of
the means for infringement simply because it is capable of nonin1 69
fringing use or because it is not specially suited to infringing use.
The staple article of commerce doctrine in patent law would man171
date such a result.170 Such would have been the result in Atari
and Arctic International 72 if the court had looked no further into
the facts than to find that the articles involved were equally capable
of noninfringing use. 173 The courts in Sony, Atari, and Arctic International weighed the "significance" of prospective noninfringing
uses for the means of infringement. 174 This weighing, although not
165. The video cassette recorder involved was the first such recorder suitable
for home use. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct.
774, 778-79 (1984). The plaintiffs sought money damages, an accounting of profits, and an injunction against the continued sale of the recorder. Id. at 777.
166. This would occur in cases where the unlawful copying reduces the volume of legitimate sales of copies of the copyrighted work or otherwise diminishes the return to the copyright owner. See, e.g., id. at 793 (discussing the
element of "harm" in the "fair use" setting).
167. See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
168. The "significance" of the noninfringing uses, which was the determining factor in the Sony case, cannot always protect against damage to the value of
the copyrights involved. Potential loss in value to the plaintiff's copyrights is,
therefore, a separate factor for judicial consideration. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v.
JS&A Group, Inc., 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6,
1983); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
This means that cases could arise in which the article provided is capable of
"significant" noninfringing uses, but the loss to the value of copyrighted works
so severe that the court should not permit its continued availability.
169. This is the description of a non-staple article under the patent statute.
See supra note 107 and text accompanying note 135.
170. In patent law, under the staple article of commerce doctrine, the provision of an article specially suited for patent infringement renders the seller liable as a contributory infringer. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1982).
171. Atari, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,613
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983).
172. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
173. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
174. The determination that the article provided was capable of noninfringing uses did not end the courts' inquiries. The courts further considered the
relative "significance" of any noninfringing use for the articles involved in each
case. In Arctic Intl, the court considered the potential uses of the article on
works similar to the plaintiff's copyrighted works in order to determine
whether it had its own intrinsic value apart from that of the plaintiff's copyrights. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. The court would only have
considered the potential for infringing use against that for permissibly copying
the defendant's own works in Atari. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The Sony Court balanced the public interest in continued use of the defendants'
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expressly reduced to clear factors by the courts, 175 did include six
cause the least
basic considerations in a balancing which sought 17to
6
aggregated harm to the three interests involved.
The first two considerations derived from the traditional contributory infringement inquiries. After the Sony Court considered
whether copyright infringement had occurred, 1 77 it inquired into
whether the defendant knowingly acted to facilitate direct infringement.17 8 A court may direct this inquiry at the acts of the defendant, which would indicate knowledge that users of its device would
infringe copyrights, or at the nature of the article sold, from which
the court might infer such knowledge. 179 The second inquiry was
whether the defendant was in a position to supervise and control
the direct infringements involved and possessed a direct financial
interest in them. 180 An affirmative answer to either inquiry would
mandate holding the defendant liable as a contributory infringer
Where the defendant provided
under the traditional analysis.'18
the means for infringement, however, these first two considerations
should only constitute a prima facie showing of contributory
8 2

infringement.1

Sony, Atari, and Arctic Internationaldemonstrate that where
8 3
the defendant provided the means for copyright infringement,1
device against that in copyright protection. See supra notes 76 & 158 and accompanying text.
175. The courts each considered similar, but separate, factors. The Arctic
Int'l court considered the potential for misappropriation of value from the
plaintiff's works and, on the other hand, the potential for independent intrinsic
value in the defendant's device. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. In
Atari, the court considered the potential for infringing use against the potential
for legitimate use of the defendant's device. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. The Sony Court balanced public policies. See supra notes 76 & 158 and
accompanying text.
176. The six considerations are as follows: 1) whether the defendants had
the right or ability to supervise and a direct financial interest in the infringing
activity; 2) whether the defendants had knowingly facilitated an act of direct
infringement; 3) whether the defendant's article would damage the value of the
plaintiff's copyrights; 4) whether the defendant's device had any inherent value
independent of the copyrights which its users infringe; 5) whether the availability of the defendant's device produces a public benefit; and 6) whether the public policy is best served by denying the availability of the device.
177. The Sony Court avoided deciding the contributory infringement issue
on the traditional basis by holding that significant noninfringing uses existed
for the defendants' video cassette recorder. In this way, the Court also avoided
deciding the issue of direct infringement. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 789.
178. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
179. See Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 785-88. See also supra notes 82 & 89 and accompanying text.
180. Sony, 104 S. Ct. at 786-87. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
A
181. See supra notes 38 & 44 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 70-101.
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other interests make additional inquiry necessary. 8 4 Each of these
courts exhibited a dual consideration of the public interest: an interest which lay on both sides of the issue of contributory infringement. On one side lay the public interest in effective protection of
the plaintiff's works; 8 5 on the other side lay an interest in continued access to the means for infringement.' 86 Public interests are
the preeminent interests involved in copyright law.' 8 7 Another
consideration is the interest of the copyright owner whose works
have been infringed. 8 8 A final, secondary consideration was for
the interest of the defendant in the device he provided.' 8 9 The interests of the copyright owner and the alleged contributory infringer, however, should remain subordinate to the public interests
involved. 19° The consideration of these several factors, therefore,
gives rise to an alternative analysis which goes beyond the traditional contributory infringement analysis.
This alternative analysis, which emerges from the staple article
of commerce doctrine, first determines whether the plaintiff has
made a prima facie showing of contributory copyright infringement. 191 Unlike the staple article of commerce doctrine as employed in patent law, 192 this analysis permits a judicial balancing of
four factors, based on the particular facts of the case. These factors
are the public interest in the device used as a means for infringement, the probable damage that continued infringement would
cause to the public interest in access to the copyrighted works, the
copyright owner's interest in continued reward for his creative endeavor, and the similar interest of the alleged contributory infringer in legitimately profiting from the means for infringement
193
which he provided.
When the balancing of these four considerations weigh in favor
of the denial of access to the means for infringement, the court
should hold the defendant liable as a contributory infringer. 194 On
184. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 12 & 13 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
188. This interest is in continued compensation for the product of his creative effort. See supra notes 13 & 76 and accompanying text.
189. This interest is similar to that of the copyright owner in his works; the
defendant has an interest in deriving compensation for making his advice publicly available. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
190. See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
(citations omitted].
191. This primafacie determination is based on the traditional contributory
infringement analysis. See supra notes 38 & 44 and accompanying text.

192. See supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 165.
194. In this type of case, the balancing of these four factors either supports a
primafacie presumption of liability based on the traditional analysis or extends
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the other hand, where these considerations balance more favorably
towards the continued free access to the defendant's device, even
where a prima facie case of contributory infringement is established, the court should hold in favor of the defendant. 195 Consequently, this alternative analysis permits a party to create a
presumption of contributory infringement or non-contributory infringement, which the opposing party has the obligation to rebut by
a preponderance of the evidence. This analysis affords greater flexibility to the courts in considering all factors involved in a particular
case.
CONCLUSION

Copyright law involves a balancing between competing interests, and any activity which impacts on these interests may upset
this balance. The existence of the judically-created doctrine of contributory infringement constitutes recognition that the courts will
act to maintain the proper balance of interests even where the copyright statute is silent. In some cases, the court may encounter factors not involved in the traditional setting; additional considerations
may enter into the balance. The courts should not be restrained
from considering the new factors entering into the balance in these
instances. The courts should make a full determination of each
case, based on its merits and its particular facts. If they are restrained from doing so, their decisions will not best serve the purpose of copyright protection or the intent of the copyright statute.
The copyright statute exists to "promote the useful arts and sciences. "196 Where the defendant provided the means for copyright
infringement, additional factors arise for judicial consideration.
liability beyond this basis. This latter extension would occur where the damage
caused to the value of the plaintiff's works greatly outweighs the benefits of
continued access to the means of infringement. See, e.g. Atari, Inc. v. JS&A
Group, Inc., 1984 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,613 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 6, 1983);
Midway Mfg. Co. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 211 U.S.P.Q. 1152 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
195. This avoids a cure that, although beneficial to the copyright owner, is
actually more deletorious to the public interest. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
This proposed analysis is similar to the "fair use" doctrine of copyright law.
The fair use doctrine balances the harmful impact of a particular infringing use
against the public interest in permitting it. It permits the courts to weigh four
factors in cases involving direct infringement and hold that it constitutes a permissible fair use of the plaintiff's copyrights. These factors are the purpose and
character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the effect of the copying on the potential value of the work, and the "amount and substantiality" of
the portion copied in relation to the work as a whole. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 104 S.Ct. 774, 791-93 (1984)
(calling fair use an "equitable rule of reason"); Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1377-78 (Ct. Cl. 1983).
196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying
text.
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These include both public and private interests, the relative value
of which depend upon the facts of the particular case. A mechanical means for determining the outcome of these cases would likely
defeat the purpose of copyright protection. Courts should employ
the traditional contributory infringement analysis to make a prima
facie determination of contributory infringment or non-contributory infringement. The additional consideration of the nature of
the means for infringement provided should then serve to either
rebut or support this presumption. This alternative analysis recognizes the fact that the conclusion of the judicial analysis should depend on more than mere consideration of the defendant's position
and activities or the nature of the article that he provided for the
infringing use of others.
Michael J. McCambridge

